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The notion of ecological rationality sees human rationality as the result of the adaptive ﬁt
between the human mind and the environment. Ecological rationality focuses the study
of decision making on two key questions: First, what are the environmental regularities to
which people’s decision strategies are matched, and how frequently do these regularities
occur in natural environments? Second, how well can people adapt their use of speciﬁc
strategies to particular environmental regularities? Research on aging suggests a number
of changes in cognitive function, for instance, deﬁcits in learning and memory that may
impact decision-making skills. However, it has been shown that simple strategies can work
well in many natural environments, which suggests that age-related deﬁcits in strategy use
may not necessarily translate into reduced decision quality. Consequently, we argue that
predictions about the impact of aging on decision performance depend not only on how
aging affects decision-relevant capacities but also on the decision environment in which
decisions are made. In sum, we propose that the concept of the ecological rationality is
crucial to understanding and aiding the aging decision maker.
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In Cicero’s de Senectute (Cicero, 1909–1914), Cato, the elder,
explains to two younger men how to ﬂourish in old age: “Nor,
again, do I now miss the bodily strength of a young man (. . .)
any more than as a young man I missed the strength of a bull
or an elephant. You should use what you have, and whatever you
may chance to be doing, do it with all your might.” Cato seems
to suggest that the key to successful aging lies not in attempting
to regain the strength of youth or to mourn its loss but in using
the available resources wisely, so as to meet one’s own aspirations
and the challenges one faces (see Baltes, 1997, for a similar per-
spective). Elaborating on this suggestion, we ﬁrst introduce the
notion of ecological rationality and suggest that the wise selection
of decision strategies that ﬁt speciﬁc ecologies is crucial to achiev-
ing good decisions (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 2011;
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Todd et al., in press). Second,we
present speciﬁc examples of how the ﬁt between simple decision
strategies and ecologies can lead to successful decision making.
In particular, we review empirical ﬁndings that suggest that while
age-related cognitive decline may lead to changes in the selection
and execution of decision strategies, the impact of such changes is
a function of the structure of the environment. Consequently, we
argue that age-related deﬁcits in strategy selection and execution
may not necessarily translate into diminished decision quality.
We conclude by presenting an outlook for future work on the
ecological rationality of aging.
ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY: THE FIT BETWEEN MIND AND
ENVIRONMENT
The concept of ecological rationality suggests three basic tenets
regarding decision making. First, the mind’s decision strategies are
adapted to particular environments. Therefore, decision strategies
are not good or bad per se but can only be evaluated relative to
the environments in which they are used. Here, we use the term
environment to refer to the statistical properties of a set of objects,
such as the correlations between attributes of these objects (i.e.,
cues) and a criterion. For example, it may be useful to describe the
environment of health plans statistically as the correlation between
the cost of monthly premium and the amount of coverage. Sec-
ond, in certain environments, simple decision strategies are able
to compete with complex strategies – less is (sometimes) more.
Third, humans largely respond adaptively to task and environ-
mental characteristics. In what follows, we provide support for
these tenets and discuss their boundary conditions.
THE MIND–ENVIRONMENT FIT
According to the notion of ecological rationality, decision strate-
gies are adapted to particular environments. Table 1 gives an
overview of various strategies that differ in complexity (e.g., in
terms of the amount of information considered) and the envi-
ronments under which they work well. Consider the following
question:Which Swiss city has more inhabitants: Geneva or Thun?
The recognition heuristic (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002) is an
inference strategy that predicts that a recognized object,most likely
Geneva and not Thun, scores higher on some criterion (popula-
tion) than an unrecognized one. The recognition heuristic is a
prime example of how, by exploiting a match between mind and
environment (i.e., all Swiss cities), a simple algorithm can lead to
efﬁcient decision making. It uses a single cue (i.e., whether or not
the person recognizes the name of two cities) to predict the cities’
relative population, the criterion of interest. The heuristic is thus
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ecologically rational in this environment because the likelihood of
recognition is highly correlated with a city’s population. In fact,
recognition may be a useful cue in many domains; cities with more
inhabitants, mountains with higher peaks, and rivers with longer
courses tend to be more often recognized than objects with lower
values on these dimensions (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002).
Recognition is not always a valid cue, however. For example, the
population of Swiss cities, but not, say, their distance from the city
Interlaken, is correlated with recognition. As a consequence, one is
well advised to use recognition when judging which of two Swiss
cities is larger, but not when asked to judge which is closer to Inter-
laken (Pohl, 2006). In sum, the recognition heuristic illustrates the
notion of mind–environment ﬁt by showing how a simple mental
mechanism can exploit the structure of speciﬁc environments.
LESS CAN BE MORE
According to common wisdom, more knowledge, more informa-
tion, and more computation should lead to better decisions, while
cognitive limitations pose a liability (see Hertwig and Todd, 2003).
Analyses of simple strategies have shown that this is not neces-
sarily the case. For example, a person recognizing many Swiss
cities can, if recognition is a good predictor, be less accurate in
judging the sizes of Swiss cities than a person recognizing fewer
cities – the less-is-more effect (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; for
a review, see Pachur, 2010). The reason is that if many cities are
recognized, the recognition heuristic cannot be applied (because
recognition does not discriminate) and other, potentially less valid
predictors need to be recruited – leading to lower inferential accu-
racy. Similarly, simple strategies may sometimes compete with or
even outperform more complex strategies. Consider, for instance,
the take-the-best (TTB) heuristic, a strategy that can be recruited
when recognition does not discriminate to infer which of two
objects has the higher criterion value,TTB simply selects the object
that is supported by the most valid predictor or“cue”(see Table 1).
TTB can be highly competitive in comparison with considerably
more complex strategies (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).
How is that possible? First, TTB can do well because in natural
environments cues are often highly correlated, and thus search-
ing for more cues does not necessarily yield new information
(Dieckmann and Rieskamp, 2007; Hogarth and Karelaia, 2007).
Second, TTB is less susceptible to overﬁtting when making predic-
tions – that is, it does not take into account (much) unsystematic
variability in the data (i.e., noise). Therefore, TTB can be a robust
strategy that leads to higher generalization performance relative to
more complex inference strategies, like multiple regression, neural
networks, and exemplar models (see Gigerenzer and Brighton,
2009, for a discussion of how TTB avoids overﬁtting).
ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING
The existence of multiple decision environments and strate-
gies poses a fundamental problem to decision makers – that of
adaptively selecting a strategy that ﬁts the particular environ-
ment. The available evidence suggests people are by and large
adaptive decision makers. For example, participants show higher
reliance on the recognition heuristic when recognition is a valid
cue (Pachur et al., 2011). More generally, decision makers seem
to be sensitive to a number of task characteristics and adjust
their strategies accordingly, including monetary information costs
(Bröder, 2000), time pressure (Rieskamp and Hoffrage, 2008),
cue–criterion relations (Rieskamp and Otto, 2006), and memory
demands (Bröder and Schiffer, 2003). There are, however, also
boundary conditions for adaptive strategy selection. First, there
are signiﬁcant individual differences in adaptivity, that is, not all
individuals adapt to task characteristics equally well (Bröder, 2003;
Newell, 2005; Rieskamp and Otto, 2006; Rieskamp, 2008). Second,
adaptivity in strategy selection is limited in dynamically changing
environments (Bröder and Schiffer, 2006; Rieskamp, 2006).
ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND THE AGING DECISION
MAKER
How can ecological rationality inform research on the impact
of aging on decision making? Research on aging suggests that
there are basic structural and neuromodulatory brain changes
with increased age that lead to cognitive decline and poor behav-
ioral outcomes in several areas of functioning, such as working-
memory, episodic memory, and executive function (see Nyberg
and Bäckman, 2010; Rodrigue and Kennedy, 2010, for reviews).
The notion of ecological rationality, however, emphasizes the key
role of the ﬁt between (simple) strategies and environments for
successful decision making and thus questions the inevitability
of poor outcomes in the face of cognitive constraints. Indeed,
the idea of ecological rationality suggests that superior cognitive
abilities may not always be necessary or desired: Less is (some-
times) more, or at least enough (Hertwig and Todd, 2003). For
example, results based on computer simulation suggest that the
aging decision maker can afford to neglect information in con-
sumer decisions because this leads to only small losses in decision
quality (Mata and Nunes, 2010). Similarly, expertise research has
provided demonstrations that experts often rely on less informa-
tion than novices (Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009), suggesting
that expertise may enable superior decision performance through
the use of simple strategies (see also Shanteau, 1992). In addition,
there is some evidence that older adults relying on simple strate-
gies can outperform younger adults in inference tasks for which
these strategies are most appropriate (Merritt et al., 2010; Worthy
and Maddox, 2012).
To the extent that people rely on simple and ecologically ratio-
nal strategies, cognitive decline associated with aging need not
always lead to decrements in decision-making quality. If the cog-
nitive decline does not compromise the execution of the simple
strategies, a high level of decision-making quality can be retained.
Decrements, however, may occur whenever aging leads to a mis-
match between the strategies used and the environments encoun-
tered. In what follows,we distinguish two ways in which aging may
limit the strategy–environment ﬁt and thus limit decision perfor-
mance. First, aging may impact how well individuals can select
the appropriate decision strategy for a particular task environ-
ment – the issue of strategy selection. Second, aging may impact
how well individuals can execute a particular strategy in a given
environment – the issue of strategy execution. Finally,we conclude
by suggesting how the concept of ecological rationality can guide
interventions to improve decision making in the elderly.
AGE DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGY SELECTION
Overall, research on aging and strategy selection suggests that older
adults are adaptive decision makers. For instance, Pachur et al.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience February 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 19 | 2
Mata et al. Ecological rationality and the aging decision maker
Table 1 | Decision strategies, respective ecologies, and studies investigating their neural substrates.
Strategy Description Appropriate environment Study investigating
neural substrates
Recognition (Goldstein
and Gigerenzer, 2002)
If one of two alternatives is recognized, infer that it
has the higher value on the criterion.
Recognition validity >0.5 (cf. Goldstein
and Gigerenzer, 2002)
Volz et al. (2006),
Rosburg et al. (2011)
Fluency (Schooler and
Hertwig, 2005)
If both alternatives are recognized but one is
recognized faster, infer that it has the higher value
on the criterion.
Fluency validity >0.5 (cf. Schooler and
Hertwig, 2005)
Volz et al. (2010)
Take-the-best
(Gigerenzer and
Goldstein, 1996)
To infer which of two alternatives has the higher
value (a) search through cues in order of validity, (b)
stop search as soon as a cue discriminates, and (c)
choose the alternative this cue favors.
High cue redundancy (cf. Hogarth and
Karelaia, 2007)
Khader et al. (2011)
Tallying (Dawes, 1979) To infer which of two alternatives has the higher
value, count the number of positive cues of each
alterative and choose the one with the higher sum.
Low cue redundancy, uncertainty
about cue weights (cf. Hogarth and
Karelaia, 2007)
–
Weighted additive
(Payne et al., 1993)
To infer which of two alternatives has the higher
value, multiply each cue value by the respective
cue weight, sum the results for each alternative,
and choose the one with the higher sum.
Low cue redundancy, good knowledge
about cue weights
–
(2009) showed that both younger (Mean age= 24, range= 19–33)
and older adults (M = 70, range= 65–86) rely more on recogni-
tion in an environment in which recognition is highly predictive
of the criterion (i.e., cities) than when it is not (i.e., diseases).
This environment or task adaptivity has been demonstrated in
other studies: Older adults adjust their search and decision strate-
gies according to the amount of information available (Mata
and Nunes, 2010), and cue–criterion relations (Mata et al., 2007,
2010). For example,Mata et al. (2007) asked younger (M = 24, age
range= 18–37) and older adults (M = 71, 64–90) to make deci-
sions in (a) a compensatory environment, in which all cues were
equally predictive of a criterionor in (b) anon-compensatory envi-
ronment, in which there was a clear ranking of cue importance.
In the former, information-intensive strategies are appropriate,
whereas the latter favors simple strategies (because some informa-
tionmay be ignoredwithout leading to a performance decrement).
Both younger and older adults tended to rely more on simpler
strategies, such as TTB, in the appropriate non-compensatory
environment, in which information could be ignored without sac-
riﬁcing inferential accuracy. In sum, consistent with the concept
of ecological rationality,most younger and older adults seem to be
aware that simpler decision strategies can lead to satisfactory out-
comes in some environments and adjust their strategy selection
accordingly (Mata et al., 2007, 2010; Pachur et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, there is some indication that older adults have
more difﬁculties in adapting their strategy selection as a function
of environment characteristics relative to younger adults. In other
words, aging may attenuate but not eliminate the ability to select
strategies adaptively. Speciﬁcally, older adults in Mata et al. (2007)
relied more on simpler strategies regardless of the environment.
Importantly, this was related to individual differences in ﬂuid abil-
ities, suggesting that age-related cognitive declinemay have limited
access to more complex strategies. In addition, adaptive strategy
selection in older adults also seems to be constrained by learning
deﬁcits. Mata et al. (2010) found that older adults (M = 69, 60–
79) had more difﬁculties with strategy selection learning on the
basis of performance feedback relative to younger adults (M = 24,
19–34). A meta-analysis by Mata et al. (2011b) on differences
between younger and older adults’ decision making under risk
supported this ﬁnding. Speciﬁcally, the analysis revealed system-
atic age differences in risk taking in tasks where the probabilities
of outcomes had to be learned from repeated exposure (decisions
from experience). In contrast, although there were some signiﬁ-
cant differences between age groups, no systematic pattern arose
in the tasks where probabilities and outcomes were conveniently
summarized to decision makers (decisions from description). These
results converge with behavioral, computational, and neuroimag-
ing analyses showing age differences in reward learning, possibly
linked to age-related decline in neuromodulatory efﬁciency such
as dopaminergic function (e.g., Mutter et al., 2007; Mell et al.,
2009; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011).
Another aspect of successful strategy selection concerns item
or trial-by-trial adaptivity (cf. Pachur, 2011). For example, despite
its simplicity, the adaptive use of the recognition heuristic requires
several abilities, including the ability to recognize objects but also
the ability to assess whether recognition is a useful indicator in
a particular environment or for a speciﬁc item. An investiga-
tion of the neural processes involved in applying the recognition
heuristic supports the postulation of such distinct processes. Volz
et al. (2006) examined the neurological underpinnings of the
recognition heuristic using functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI). In this study participants repeatedly had to indicate
which of two cities they thought was larger.When a decision could
be made based on recognition, there was activation in the medial
parietal cortex, which can be attributed to reliance on recogni-
tion memory. In addition, there was independent activation in
the anterior frontomedial cortex (aFMC), a brain area involved in
evaluating internal states, including self-referential processes and
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social–cognitive judgments (e.g., relating an aspect of the external
world to oneself). The processes underlying this aFMC activation
are likely associatedwith evaluatingwhether recognition is a useful
cue in the current judgment situation. Importantly,behavioral evi-
dence suggests that this evaluation process requires considerable
cognitive resources. Pachur and Hertwig (2006) asked participants
to judge which of two infectious diseases is more prevalent, a deci-
sion environment in which recognition has low validity. It turned
out that inferences were more likely to follow recognition under
time pressure than without time pressure. This suggests that eval-
uating whether recognition should be applied on a speciﬁc item is
an effortful process that requires some time.
Given the cognitive costs necessary to adaptively suspend the
recognition heuristic on a trial-by-trial basis, older adults may
fare worse than younger adults in doing so. Evidence for such
age-related decrements in item adaptivity was found by Pachur
et al. (2009). Investigating younger and older German adults’ use
of recognition in judging the relative frequency of diseases, it was
shown that older adults were constrained in their ability to adap-
tively suspend the recognition heuristic on speciﬁc items for which
recognitionwas not a good cue. For example, the disease Leprosy is
recognized by most individuals but is also known to be practically
extinct in the German population. As a result, one will do well to
bet against recognition when faced with a pair involving Leprosy
and some other unrecognized disease – but older adults were less
able to do so, often picking the recognized disease. Importantly,
these agedifferenceswerepartlymediatedby individual differences
in ﬂuid cognitive abilities, suggesting that age-related cognitive
decline drives the age-related deﬁcit in adaptive strategy selection
(suspension) of the recognition heuristic on a trial-by-trial basis.
Based on the results byVolz et al. (2006), one may hypothesize that
age differences in the suspension of the recognition heuristic are
mediated by frontal structures such as the aFMC. Future work in
the decision neuroscience of aging could thus inform the debate
concerning the impact of aging on adaptive strategy selection.
In sum, both young and older adults seem to adjust their
strategy selection as a function of environment structure (environ-
ment or task adaptivity). Nevertheless, age-related decline in ﬂuid
abilities including learning deﬁcits may somewhat constrain the
strategies available to older participants and the ability to adjust
strategy selection on a trial-by-trial basis (item or trial-by-trial
adaptivity).
AGE DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGY EXECUTION
Selecting the right strategy for a given problem is a necessary but
not sufﬁcient condition for successful decision making. To make
the right choice one must also be able to execute the strategy cor-
rectly. Some ﬁndings suggest that aging can lead to difﬁculties
in strategy execution. Mata et al. (2010) used a computational
model to decompose the strategy selection learning process of
younger and older adults, which included a strategy execution
component. The results suggest that there are considerable age
differences in the execution errors of younger and older adults
and that these differ by strategy: Older adults showed increased
strategy execution errors relative to younger adults particularly in
an environment favoring complex strategies that require extensive
integration and weighing of information. Similar age differences
in strategy execution have been reported in studies that explicitly
instructed younger and older adults to apply decision strategies
(e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
An additional factor mediating age differences in strategy exe-
cution may be the way in which decision-relevant information
is represented – such as whether decisions are made from tabu-
lated information or from memory. Retrieving information from
memory can sometimes be an effortful process requiring consid-
erable involvement of control structures. In a neuroimaging study,
Khader et al. (2011) monitored the activation of speciﬁc represen-
tations of attribute knowledge in long-term-memory with fMRI
while participants made memory-based decisions using TTB. The
amount of information required for a decision was reﬂected in
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and this
activation seemed to modulate posterior areas responsible for
memory storage. Because aging is associated with deﬁcits in some
frontal control structures as well as storage components of mem-
ory (Nyberg and Bäckman, 2010; Spreng et al., 2010) it is likely that
older adults show difﬁculties in the selective retrieval of informa-
tion in decisions from memory. Indeed, older adults seem to avoid
strategies that rely heavily on memory retrieval in inference tasks
(i.e., exemplar processing; Mata et al., 2011a). Neuroimaging stud-
ies focusing on the neural substrates of memory retrieval during
decision making could help to better understand the contribution
of frontal and posterior areas to age differences in decisions from
memory.
Summing up, age-related cognitive decline may lead to deﬁcits
in strategy execution but these effects are likely to be moder-
ated by strategy and task complexity, for example, the memory
requirements of the task.
AIDING THE AGING DECISION MAKER
There is considerable interest in cognitive enhancement of the
elderly (Hertzog et al., 2009), aswell as in reducing the learning and
memory requirements of decision tasks to reduce age differences
in decision performance (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). However,
as suggested above, the notion of ecological rationality suggests
that enhancing cognitive abilities may not always be necessary or
desired: Simple strategies can often do as well or even better than
more complex ones (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Accordingly,
rather than simply enhancing cognition, we must aim at identi-
fying the speciﬁc situations that beneﬁt from such enhancements
to ensure successful decision making by the elderly. For example,
we predict that enhancing older adults’ ﬂuid abilities could lead
to improvements in decision quality in environments that require
the integration of many pieces of information, and thus favor the
use of complex decision strategies. In contrast, cognitive enhance-
ment should not beneﬁt and could even hinder performance in
environments in which simple strategies work well, for example,
in non-compensatory environments (Mata et al., 2007, 2011b; see
also Hills and Hertwig, 2011).
The notion of ecological rationality also implies that enhancing
the strategy–environment ﬁt is key to improving decision making.
One way to do this is to inform or train participants about the
link between particular strategies and environments. Alternatively,
one may want to change the task characteristics to ﬁt the decision
strategies of the elderly. For example, the provision of clear cue
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rankings may facilitate the subsequent use of non-compensatory
strategies. No doubt more effort needs to be invested in under-
standing how task and environment characteristics can be used to
improve decisions (Hibbard and Peters, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein,
2008).
OUTLOOK
Linking evidence from behavioral, computational, and neural
analyses seems crucial to fully understand how aging impacts deci-
sion making. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there has been no
work examining how aging impacts the neural substrates respon-
sible for the selection or execution of decision strategies, and
computational modeling in this domain is in its infancy. There
is perhaps something to be gained by informing the study of
the ecological rationality of aging through insights from more
researched domains, such as arithmetic skill or memory (Lemaire,
2010; Nyberg and Bäckman, 2010).
Second, more work is needed to understand the factors
that determine age differences in strategy selection. While most
work emphasizes cognitive constraints, others suggest important
goal-related and motivational aspects. For example, there may be
systematic differences in how younger and older adults approach
decision problems, with older adults tending to emphasize accu-
racy over speed (Ratcliff et al., 2007) or the valence of information
(Hanoch et al., 2007).
Finally, the work reviewed above mostly concerns age differ-
ences observed in laboratory studies and artiﬁcial stimuli (see
Pachur et al., 2009, for an exception). Consequently, we know rela-
tively little about the natural decision environments of young and
older adults, or differences in the representation of environments
by different age groups. An ecological analysis of the decision envi-
ronments that older adults face is necessary to assess the adaptivity
of the speciﬁcdecision strategies used. For example,doolder adults
or those looking out for them actively select or engineer environ-
ments so as to enable the use of simple strategies? Only by gaining
a better understanding of both older adults’ decision strategies
and ecologies will we be able to provide decision aids and redesign
environments that support good decisions. We can thus hope to
fulﬁll Cicero’s vision of successful aging by matching older adults’
resources to the structure of their decision environments.
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